Phylogenetic taxonomy has been introduced as a replacement for the Linnaean system. It di¡ers from traditional nomenclature in de¢ning taxon names with reference to phylogenetic trees and in not employing ranks for supraspeci¢c taxa. However,`species' are currently kept distinct. Within a system of phylogenetic taxonomy we believe that taxon names should refer to monophyletic groups only and that species should not be recognized as taxa. To distinguish the smallest identi¢ed taxa, we here introduce the least-inclusive taxonomic unit (LITU), which are di¡erentiated from more inclusive taxa by initial lower-case letters. LITUs imply nothing absolute about inclusiveness, only that subdivisions are not presently recognized.
Evolution is the unifying theory in modern biology. Our understanding of evolutionary relationships among organisms are represented by tree models. The hierarchy or the topology of the trees can be translated into words when we name organismal groups. The current method of naming groups, i.e. the Linnaean system of nomenclature, originated over 100 years before the advent of Darwin's (1859) On the origin of species and makes no reference to evolution (de Queiroz & Gauthier 1994) . It is now regulated by the di¡erent nomenclatural codes for plants, animals, bacteria and viruses. As outlined in, for example, the International code of zoological nomenclature (International Commission on Zoological Nomenclature 1985) , the ultimate goals of the system are to`promote stability and universality . . . and to ensure that the name of each taxon is unique and distinct ' (p. 3) . There are a number of practical di¡erences between the codes. However, they are uni¢ed by three characteristics: (i) taxon names are ¢xed by types, (ii) taxa are referred to ranks (genus, family, etc.) , and (iii) a special rank called species exists which is referred to in a binominal form. While there is general agreement that the goals of stability, universality and uniqueness are essential, it has become increasingly clear that Linnaean nomenclature fails to meet them (e.g. Gri¤ths 1976; de Queiroz & Gauthier 1994) . Instead, it provides an ine¤cient and even misleading system where the same name can be applied for di¡erent groups and di¡erent names can be applied for the same group (¢gure 1). These problems stem from the application of the type^rank construct which is inadequate for unambiguous representations of monophyletic groups. The binominal nomenclature currently used for species adds an additional layer of instability, as each generic reallocation will result in a change of the name of species taxa, even though there has not been any change in their concept or inclusivity (Cantino 1998) . As an example, a European swimmer crab was named by Linnaeus as Cancer depurator, but is now listed in the literature under the three additional names Portunus depurator, Macropipus depurator and Liocarcinus depurator. In fact, this binominal system is one of the worst possible imaginable, given an ultimate aim of stability. Considering the pre-Darwinian origin of the Linnaean system these problems are hardly surprising, but its current shortcomings have profound consequences both conceptually and practically for all biologists, not just taxonomists.
The need for relating taxa to knowledge of trees has been recognized for some time (Gri¤ths 1974) and in recent years an alternative system, phylogenetic taxonomy (or phylogenetic nomenclature), has emerged (e.g. de Queiroz & Gauthier 1990 , 1992 , 1994 . This new system directly relates taxon names to tree topologies and includes no reference to supraspeci¢c ranks. A point in a tree topology is speci¢ed and the taxon name re£ects all descendants from that point (¢gure 2). There are signi¢cant advantages in shifting to a system of phylogenetic taxonomy. It explicitly connects nomenclature to tree thinking (O'Hara 1988) and it permits taxon names to be unambiguously de¢ned. Complicated synonymies and the entailing uninformative`lumping' and`splitting' issues (¢gure 1b,c) are avoided and it will allow systematists more time to recover phylogenies instead of disentangling nomenclatural problems. Furthermore, the shift to phylogenetic taxonomy can be achieved with a minimum of name changes. Existing supraspeci¢c names can simply be imported into the new system by giving them new de¢nitions and disregarding their rank connotations. In view of the problems outlined above, binomina should be converted into uninomina and a series of suggestions have been outlined (Cantino et al. 1999) . The conservative resistance to a phylogenetic taxonomy (Dominguez & Wheeler 1997; Lide¨n et al. 1997 ) was predictable, but we believe it has been e¡ectively refuted (Lee 1996; de Queiroz 1997) . The new system is rapidly gaining interest and a new code of nomenclature for phylogenetic taxonomy, thè PhyloCode' , is under development.
However, in most current literature on phylogenetic taxonomy`species' are distinguished as a di¡erent kind of taxon in much the same way as the Linnaean system did. There are three substantial problems with continuing this tradition.
(i) Species mean di¡erent things to di¡erent people and several hundred years of discussion does not seem to have o¡ered any resolution. For example, a recent review (Mayden 1997) listed 22 species concepts in present use, and in only the last ten years we have seen the advent of approximately the same number of books dealing with various species concepts. In spite of recent attempts to synthesize these di¡erent approaches into single, more uni¢ed concepts (de Queiroz 1998 (de Queiroz , 1999 , we see little hope for any consensus on the issue. The current plurality is unfortunate in that it entails ambiguity: what kind of entity is an author actually referring to when naming a species ? (ii) Under most current concepts, the term species delineates groups which may be either monophyletic or non-monophyletic (de Queiroz 1998). Studies of brown bears (Ursus arctos) and polar bears (Ursus maritimus) have provided well-documented examples of a paraphyletic species. Ursus arctos is paraphyletic because U. maritimus has a sister-group relationship within some island populations of brown bears (Talbot & Shields 1996) . This information is lost by maintaining U. arctos as a taxon which excludes U. maritimus. Hence, even in the unlikely event of a general consensus on a single concept among systematists, both species and the more inclusive term`taxa' will remain ambiguous and refer to several di¡erent kinds of entities. A point on the lineage a leading to A^D is speci¢ed and Z will refer to all parts of that monophyletic group. There are several suggestions for specifying a point in the tree, including node-based, stem-based and apomorphy-based de¢nitions (e.g. de Queiroz & Gauthier 1990 , 1992 . A stem-based example could take the form`Z is the most inclusive clade including A but not E' (Schander & Thollesson 1995) . Z will by de¢nition always refer to a monophyletic group and, compared to the Linnaean system, the issue of interest will shift from which name to apply to the topology of the tree.
(iii) In virtually all cases, the connection between the named species and the empirical evidence that justi¢es its status is weak or non-existent. Put simply, how many species descriptions actually provide any measures of, for example, reproductive isolation (biological species concept) (Mayr 1942 (Mayr , 1963 , adaptive zones (ecological species concept) (Van Valen 1976) or reproductive recognition systems (recognition species concept) (Paterson 1985) ?
Species are currently designated as such by taxonomists who are forced by the existing codes of nomenclature to describe organisms as species when in fact they generally have no idea of what is going on in nature. Given that the avowed aim of taxonomy is to promote stable and unambiguous names, the application of species as a special type of taxon is both unnecessary and confusing and so this practice should be eliminated (Mishler 1999; Pleijel 2000) . In other words, making taxonomists decide that a few dead specimens represent a species is an extravagant extrapolation that has no place in science. We instead suggest that taxa should always constitute the same kind of entities; named monophyletic groups which are identi¢ed by unique shared similarities (apomorphies). This view represents a logical completion of the system of phylogenetic taxonomy.
While we argue that taxa should refer to a singular kind of entity, we nevertheless acknowledge that it is useful for labelling groups which at present are not further subdivided. For this we introduce the concept of the least-inclusive taxonomic unit (LITU). Identi¢cation of taxa as LITUs are statements about the current state of knowledge (or lack thereof ) without implying that they have no internal nested structure ; we simply do not know if a given LITU consists of several monophyletic groups or not. In order to make them readily identi¢able, we further suggest that LITUs be written with all lowercase letters, whereas all other, more inclusive taxon names have an initial capital letter (¢gure 3). This suggestion was previously forwarded to tag species names in phylogenetic taxonomy (Graybeal 1995) . It is important to note that the status of a name can change from being a LITU. For example, the hypothetical taxon chimaera in ¢gure 3a is in lower-case, indicating that there are no recognized subtaxa within. However, if at a later point monophyletic groups are identi¢ed as part of chimaera, then the name will simply shift to Chimaera, as in ¢gure 3b and the LITU designations will transfer to these new, less inclusive taxa (capra, draco and leo). The usefulness of the term is that LITUs will represent the smallest units currently recognized and that users of taxonomies will easily be able to identify non-overlapping groups. The practical applicability of the LITU concept is illustrated in a forthcoming description of a new polychaete annelid (Pleijel & Rouse 2000) .
Ending the tradition of recognizing species as taxa and the introduction of the LITU concept will make it obvious that tree resolution and smallest units re£ect nothing but our current state of knowledge. This in turn will lead away from measures founded on the view as species being some kind of basic comparable units in biodiversity and in evolution.
We thank Kevin de Queiroz, Torsten Eriksson, Kristian Fauchald, Len Hirsch and Alastair Simpson for comments and discussions (agreements or disagreements not implied). This study was supported by Australian Research Council research fellowships (G.W.R.). permits us to recognize and name three monophyletic subgroups and`chimaera' therefore becomes`Chimaera'. Notice that in (a) we have not committed ourselves by making any statement about chimaera referring to a species; based on the apomorphy a we only made the uncontradicted statement that it is a monophyletic group.
